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CLEANING UP DISASTER OR MAKING MORE?
A LOOK AT AVENUES OF RELIEF FOR THOSE DEVASTATED
BY THE CLEAN-UP EFFORTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, issues have surfaced con-
cerning real property damage caused by clean-up efforts in cities
already devastated by the hurricane's destructive path.1 Specifi-
cally, the concern is that government agencies charged with clean-
up efforts will further damage real property.2 Under the Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (DREAA), federal agencies
have the explicit authority to remove debris after major disasters
have occurred.3 In reality, these governmental agency actions can
often add to the damage of real property.4 Sovereign immunity
protecting the United States may diminish or abolish the chance of
relief for those whose real property is damaged by the govern-
ment's actions. 5 Without statutory permission to sue the United
States or an express waiver of sovereign immunity, harmed parties
may not sue the United States or its agencies; thus no legal or equi-
1. See Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome & Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone
Report, Hurricane Katrina, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER 10-13 (2005), available at
www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005-Katrina.pdf (discussing cause and effect
of Hurricane Katrina).
2. See Air Monitoring and Contingency Plan for Hurricane Katrina Debris Activities
Louisiana 5 (2005), epa.gov/sab/appendix-c-air-mon-plankatrinadebris_09-
2005.pdf (discussing preparation for waste of hazardous materials). Possible dam-
age includes contamination of drinking water and/or groundwater, as well as inad-
vertent structural damage related to clean-up projects. See id. In late summer
2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama coastlines. See
Knabb et al, supra note 1, at 1 (providing information about Hurricane Katrina).
The severe impact of the hurricane was realized soon after the skies cleared, and
Hurricane Katrina quickly became one of the largest natural disasters in United
States history. See id.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 5173 (2000) (granting authorization for clean-up efforts).
See also Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home Park v. Phillips & Jordan, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 283,
286 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (explaining statutory mandate of hurricane clean-up). The
DREAA is also known as the Stafford Act. See id.
4. For a discussion of the implications of clean-up efforts, see supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
5. See Maruska v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1041 (D. Minn. 1999)
(holding suit against sovereign if judgment sought would expend itself on public
domain, interfere with public administration, or if effect of judgment would re-
strain government from acting or to compel to act). Sovereign immunity pre-
cludes suit against the United States absent statutory consent. See id. at 1037.
(83)
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table remedies are available for those seeking redress. 6 Despite this
seemingly absolute immunity, Congress enacted the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), providing a comprehensive remedy against the
United States for tort claims arising out of the negligent and/or
wrongful acts or omissions of federal employees while acting within
the scope of their employment or office. 7
On the surface, the FTCA provides potential relief when clean-
up efforts exacerbate the damaged property of individuals.8 Upon
close examination, however, the FTCA's Discretionary Function Ex-
ception clause limits recovery.9 This statutory clause reinforces sov-
ereign immunity for lawsuits involving services performed in the
exercise of a statute or regulation. 10 Because the DREAA oversees
governmental response to disasters, any action stemming from this
statute invalidates claims arising out of disaster relief I I When sur-
veying the damage Hurricane Katrina caused, the issue then be-
comes whether the FTFCA compensates those who suffered true and
extensive property damage from the clean-up efforts. 12
This Comment will first provide a short overview of Hurricane
Katrina and survey the destruction the storm caused. 13 Part II will
then discuss the DREAA14 and the FTCA. 15 This section also dis-
cusses cases illustrating the lack of relief mechanisms for those indi-
viduals suffering damage. 16 Part III will analyze potential claims
6. See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 1980) [(overruled on
other grounds, High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1990))] (stating equitable and legal remedies barred unless sovereign
immunities are waived); Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732, 736 (5th Cir. 1968) (stat-
ing no suit may be brought against governmental agency absent consent); De-
Tienne v. DeTienne, 815 F. Supp. 394, 396 (D. Kan. 1993) (stating no suit may be
brought against the United States absent consent).
7. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2412, 2671-80 (2000)
(providing text of FTCA). The FTCA also confers exclusive jurisdiction for such
actions upon the federal district courts. See id. § 1346(b).
8. See id. (providing test for FTCA).
9. See id. (providing text of Discretionary Function Exception of FTCA).
10. See id. (providing text of Discretionary Function Exception of FTCA).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 5173 (2000) (setting forth text of statute).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000) (providing text of statute governing possi-
ble relief).
13. For a discussion of Hurricane Katrina, see infra notes 19-23 and accompa-
nying text.
14. For a discussion of the DREAA and the FTCA, see infra notes 24-55 and
accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the FTCA, see infra notes 31-55 and accompanying
text.
16. For a discussion of cases illustrating lack of relief avenues, see infra notes
56-75 and accompanying text.
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using current precedent. 17 Part IV will conclude with the impend-
ing outcome of those seeking relief for further damage. 8
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina was an extremely destructive storm, ranking
among the most costly and deadly hurricanes to ever fall upon a
coastline of the United States. 19 The American Red Cross esti-
mated that damage exceeded two billion dollars. 20 Within days of
Katrina hitting land, governments declared "disasters" in numerous
counties in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi. 21 The
storm obliterated entire cities. 22 In addition to the natural wrath
these states suffered, some residents still remaining in the damaged
cities looted stores in the hopes of finding food, water and
shelter.2 3
B. The Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
Under the DREAA, the president may explicitly authorize fed-
eral agencies to remove debris following a disaster, such as Hurri-
cane Katrina. 24 The statute provides in relevant part:
17. For a discussion of potential claims, see infra notes 76-119 and accompa-
nying text.
18. For a discussion of the conclusions reached concerning relief under the
FTCA, see infra notes 120-38 and accompanying text.
19. See Knabb, et al., supra note 1, at 10-13 (discussing overall impact of Hurri-
cane Katrina). Hurricane Katrina's first landfall strength was a Category One. See
id. It then strengthened to a Category Five hurricane while crossing the Gulf of
Mexico and weakened to a Category Three before hitting land on the northern
Gulf Coast, which is an area particularly vulnerable to storm surge. See id. at 10.
Although Katrina is known to be one of the most deadly storms to ever hit the
United States, an exact comparison cannot be made due to the unknown number
of actual deaths caused by this hurricane and the unknown number of fatalities
caused by past hurricanes. See id. at 11.
20. See Facts at a Glance: American Red Cross Response to Hurricane Katrina
and Rita (2006), http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/hurricanes/katrina-facts
.html (providing damage estimates of Hurricane Katrina).
21. See HURRICANE KATRINA INFORMATION, DISASTER DECLARATIONS (2006),
http://www.fema.gov/hazard/hurricane/2005katrina/index.shtm (providing dis-
aster declarations).
22. See Knabb, et al., supra, note 1, at 27 (discussing devastating effects of
Hurricane Katrina).
23. See Views from Elsewhere: Break the Katrina Code, THE TOWN TALK (2005),
http://www.thetowntalk.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060218/ OPINION/
602180330/1014 (discussing citizen reaction to storm devastation).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 5173 (2000) (providing agency authority under Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act).
2007]
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a) Presidential Authority. The President, whenever he de-
termines it to be in the public interest, is authorized-
(1) through the use of Federal departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities, to clear debris and wreckage resulting
from a major disaster from publicly and privately owned
lands and waters .... 25
The language of the statute gives the president the explicit right to
order the removal of hurricane debris. 26 It specifically states that
"departments, agencies, or instrumentalities" of the government
should remove debris in the event of a "major disaster."27 Hurri-
cane Katrina is a major disaster, giving the president the authority
to order the removal of any debris. 28 Relief statutes, such as the
DREAA, consider public policy and concern for the well-being of
United States citizens.29 Regardless of the good intentions underly-
ing the enactment of this statute, applicable exceptions coupled
with sovereign immunity have the potential to further devastate
those in dire need of assistance. 30
C. The Federal Tort Claims Act
In 1946, Congress enacted the FTCA, which enables an individ-
ual to sue the government for loss of property resulting from gov-
ernment agents negligently causing harm through wrongful acts or
omissions in the exercise of the agents' enumerated goals.31 The
controlling statute for hurricane debris removal is the DREAA. 32
One of the FTCA's enumerated purposes is to "compensate the vic-
tims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities in cir-
cumstances like unto those in which a private person would be
liable and not to leave just treatment to the caprice and legislative
25. See id. (providing text of statute).
26. See id. (referring to text of statute focused on presidential authority).
27. See id. (stating specific entities responsible for cleaning up debris).
28. See id. (concluding applicability based on entire text of statute).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 5173 (a) (referring to purpose of statute).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000) (providing exceptions to statute).
31. See id. § 2679 (providing exclusive remedy of statute); see also Erin K. Hay-
ner, Failure to Warn and the Federal Tort Claims Act: An Overview of Potential Claims of
Lower Manhattan Residents in the Wake of the World Trade Center Disaster, 10 ALB. L.
ENVTL. OUTLOOKJ. 115, 125-26 (2005) (discussing New York state law and FTCA).
The FTCA also affords an individual the ability to bring suit against the govern-
ment for personal injury or loss of property. See id. at 125.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (2000) (providing definitions).
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burden of individual private laws." 33 This goal is vital in consider-
ing whether relief may be granted under the FTCA.3 4
In the context of Hurricane Katrina clean-up efforts, the gov-
ernment could potentially be liable for any damage an individual
would be liable for, if that individual's actions resulted in further
loss or property damage. 35 Speculative damages include further
damage to the structural integrity of real property, contamination
of groundwater and failure to clean-up areas that the government
stated it would. 36 Unfortunately, after analyzing potential relief ave-
nues, recovery is unlikely for any claims on these grounds.37 The
following sections discuss possible statutory impediments to collect-
ing monetary damages from the government under the FTCA.
i. Discretionary Function Exception to the FTCA
Under the FTCA, the government is liable to the harmed party
when the United States is treated by the courts as a liable individ-
ual.3 8 The law where the act or omission occurred determines the
possibility of an individual lawsuit.39 The following section limits
the overall reach of the FTCA:
The provisions [of the FTCA] shall not apply to:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an em-
ployee of the Government, exercising due care, in the exe-
cution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused. 40
The statute defines "agency" to include executive departments, ju-
dicial and legislative branches, military departments, independent
establishments of the United States and corporations primarily act-
33. See Hayner, supra note 31, at 126 (quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-9 (1955)) (discussing purpose of FTCA). In Indian Towing
Co., the Supreme Court held the government liable for its negligent operation of a
lighthouse that resulted in damage. See id. at 127 (describing holding of case).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (implicating purpose in application).
35. See id. (discussing circumstances in which government would be held
liable).
36. See Hayner, supra note 31, at 126 (enumerating potential claims).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (stating exceptions that limit recovery under FTCA).
38. See Hayner, supra note 31, at 126 (discussing when government is liable)
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (providing jurisdictional limitations).
40. See id. § 2680(a) (setting forth text of statute).
2007]
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ing as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States. 41 Under
the statute, the phrase "employee of the government" includes of-
ficers or employees of federal agencies, members of the military or
naval forces, members of the National Guard and persons acting on
behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity. 42 The phrase "act-
ing within the scope of employment" is defined as acting "in [the]
line of duty."43
The Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine
whether an act falls within the Discretionary Function Exception,
and therefore bars an individual's recovery. 44 In Berkovitz v. United
States (Berkowitz), 4 5 the Supreme Court established the reviewing
court must first decide whether Congress intended to exclude the
act or omission.46 This includes analyzing whether the conduct in-
volves elements of judgment or choice, or whether the conduct is
directed by a statute or regulation. 47 Specifically, the relevant in-
quiry involves determining whether a controlling statute or regula-
tion mandates governmental action be performed in a specific
manner.48 Second, the Supreme Court stated the reviewing court
must decide whether the action involves legislative or administra-
tive decisions based on social, economic and public policy.49
If the action either fails this two-part test or falls under one of
the enumerated exceptions to the FTCA, the claim must be dis-
41. See id. § 2671 (defining words used in statute).
42. See id. (defining words used in statute).
43. See id. (defining words used in statute).
44. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1988) (establishing
two-part test for determining whether Discretionary Function Exception is applica-
ble to suit).
45. See id. at 536-37 (providing holding).
46. See id. (holding Congress has marked boundaries upon willingness to ex-
tend tort liability through Discretionary Function Exception).
47. See Daniels v. United States, 967 F.2d 1463, 1464-65 (10th Cir. 1992) (pro-
viding illustrative example of proper judgment and choice authorized under Dis-
cretionary Function Exception to FTCA); Hayner, supra note 31, at 133 (discussing
process under which FTCA is analyzed); see also Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F.2d
951, 954-55 (10th Cir. 1991) (providing illustrative example of gray area in deter-
mining whether conduct is discretionary).
48. See Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home Park v. Phillips &Jordan, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 283,
286 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (quoting Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1125 (11th
Cir. 1993)) (discussing elements of choice).
49. See id. (examining second prong of Discretionary Function Exception).
This test is derived from ample precedent defining the role of the Discretionary
Function Exception. See id. at 285 (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315,
322-23 (1991); Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1988); United States
v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797,
813-15 (1984); Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1527-31 (11th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1081 (1994)).
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missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.50 An inherent excep-
tion to the FTCA is "where a regulation or statute authorizes a
federal agency or employee to make decisions of a policy nature,
the decisions are immune from judicial review because of the need
to avoid seriously handicapping efficient government operations."51
Additionally, the FTCA exception extends to abuse of discretion
policy judgments. 52 When faced with redevelopment, rehabilita-
tion or clean-up activities, the courts generally hold the govern-
ment's conduct to be within the Discretionary Function Exception
to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity, thereby barring the
claimant's chance of relief.53
In general, the government is protected under the Discretion-
ary Function Exception if: (1) its conduct and/or omission was
based on public policy considerations or (2) its actions were to fur-
ther the agency's agenda.5 4 The Discretionary Function Exception
shields public policy decisions from liability.55 These cases provide
great hurdles for those harmed parties seeking relief for further
50. See Sunrise, 960 F. Supp. at 284 (explaining procedural process for FTCA
claims).
51. See id. at 285 (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963))
(discussing policy issues).
52. See Autery, 992 F.2d at 1528 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Dickerson, Inc. v.
United States, 875 F.2d 1577, 1581 (11th Cir. 1989)) (discussing standard for de-
termining Discretionary Function Exception).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000) (providing statutory text of statute). See
also United States v. Green, 33 F. Supp. 2d 203, 222-23 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding
claim barred under Discretionary Function Exception); Sayre v. United States, 282
F. Supp. 175, 190-91 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (finding government owed no duty to
plaintiff); United States v. Amtreco, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1576, 1581-83 (M.D. Ga.
1992) (holding Discretionary Function Exception to government's waiver of sover-
eign immunity was applicable); Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home Park v. Phillips &Jordan,
Inc., 960 F. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction
because alleged governmental negligence in monitoring and supervising its con-
tractor was within FTCA's Discretionary Function Exception); Goddard v. Dist. of
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 287 F.2d 343, 345-46 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(holding suit was based on discretionary actions of governmental employees and
barred by FTCA); but see Clark v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1164, 1175-77 (W.D.
Wash. 1987) (ruling for plaintiffs where contamination of well water resulted from
hazardous waste dump sites and burn pits on Air Force base adjacent to plaintiffs
property); Melton v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 1066, 1071-75 (D.D.C. 1980) (rul-
ing Discretionary Function Exception did not apply where government negligently
selected contractors to rehabilitate homeowner's property and negligently super-
vised rehabilitation project).
54. See Hayner, supra note 31, at 131 (discussing conduct covered by Discre-
tionary Function Exception).
55. See id. (discussing exception when effort based on public policy). In Dube
v. Pittsburgh Corning, the First Circuit stated the Discretionary Function Exception
is a narrow one, and is only applicable to actual decisions based on public policy.
See Dube v. Pittsburgh Coming, 870 F.2d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1989).
2007]
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property damage caused by governmental negligence in natural dis-
aster clean-up.
D. Cases Barring Relief
In Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park v. Phillips &Jordan, Inc. (Sun-
rise),56 the plaintiff property owners alleged governmental negli-
gence in the supervision of their contractors during removal of
hurricane debris.57 In response, the United States filed both a mo-
tion to dismiss and in the alternative, a motion for summary judg-
ment.58 The contents of the claim "necessarily" arose out of the
FTCA and its express waiver of sovereign immunity.59 Recognizing
the limitations of the FTCA and the Discretionary Function Excep-
tion of the FTCA, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 60
In applying the two-part test, the court found: (1) the DREAA
gives agencies permission to contract for debris removal and (2)
the government's decisions concerning the timing, location and
the process of how to remove debris after a major disaster are the
type of policy decisions that fall within the Discretionary Function
Exception. 6 1 Additionally, the court said absent a "fixed or readily
ascertainable standard" providing a guide for government conduct,
the government's decisions are discretionary. 62 Because the plain-
tiffs did not allege facts to support findings that governmental dis-
cretion in debris removal was not grounded in public policy or that
negligence was related to debris removal, the court found the gov-
ernment's actions to fall within the Discretionary Function Excep-
tion and dismissed the suit accordingly. 63
In Devito v. United States (Devito),64 plaintiffs alleged the Army
Corps of Engineers negligently conducted three projects to combat
56. 960 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
57. See id. at 283 (reviewing claims and posture of case).
58. See id. at 284 (setting forth United States' procedural actions taken in re-
sponse to plaintiff's claims).
59. See id. (providing background information on plaintiff's claim on United
States' negligence in removing debris from plaintiffs property).
60. See id. (providing holding of case in favor of United States).
61. See Sunrise, 960 F. Supp. at 284 (applying two-part test to determine
whether conduct was within Discretionary Function Exception).
62. See id. at 286 (quoting Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1125 (11th
Cir. 1993)) (providing standard for determining whether government conduct is
discretionary).
63. See id. at 286-87 (stating holding of case in favor of government because
Discretionary Function Exception applies).
64. 12 F. Supp. 2d 269 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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hurricane damage by stabilizing certain shorelines. 65 The court
ruled that the Corps's decision regarding the proper method to
combat hurricane damage satisfied the Discretionary Function Ex-
ception's two-part test and thus barred the plaintiffs' recovery.
66
First, the court determined that an element of choice still remained
in policies for stabilizing shorelines, and the effects therefore in-
volved the requisite requirement ofjudgment or choice. 67 Second,
the court determined a wide range of policy considerations were
included in the Corps's tactical decisions. 68
In Easton v. Gilbert S. Corp. (Easton),69 the government and a
corporation deposited hurricane debris on the plaintiffs real prop-
erty.70 The plaintiff brought action to hold the government, the
corporation and the insurer liable under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)
for response costs associated with evaluating the threatened release
of hazardous waste at the property site. 71 The magistrate found the
government immune from suit, because disposing hurricane debris
was a discretionary function under the DREAA, and therefore, sov-
ereign immunity applied. 72
The Discretionary Function Exception to the DREAA is similar
to the Discretionary Function Exception under the FTCA, and
states the following:
The Federal Government shall not be held liable for any
claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of the Federal agency or an employee of
the Federal Government in carrying out the provisions of
this Chapter.73
65. See id. at 269-70 (providing plaintiffs claims for relief for damages and
accelerated erosion violating FTCA).
66. See id. at 270-72 (holding in favor of United States because Discretionary
Function Exception granted immunity).
67. See id. at 272 (discussing element of choice which allows government to
use its discretion and providing immunity for its actions).
68. See id. (discussing policy considerations that justify government's decision
not to use sand fills or sand bypassing).
69. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20564, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 1994).
70. See id. at **1-2 (providing facts of case where harmful substances were
deposited on plaintiff's property).
71. See id. (discussing case background entailing violation of CERCLA and
resulting liability for costs created).
72. See id. at *12 (concluding that DREAA's Discretionary Function Exception
provided immunity).
73. See id. at **2-3 (noting similarities between Discretionary Function Excep-
tion provisions in DREAA and FTCA).
2007]
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In recognizing the similarities between the FTCA and the DREAA,
the court employed the same two-part test to determine whether
the acts were discretionary under the DREAA, just as it did under
the FTCA.74 The court dismissed the complaint, finding the re-
moval of hurricane debris within the ambit of the DREAA's Discre-
tionary Function Exception because (1) there was no mandated
course of action for removing debris and (2) the removal of debris
implicated the policy decisions the exception was designed to
protect.75
III. ANALYSIS
After Hurricane Katrina, many citizens are concerned with the
potential for further damage to their real property.76 Determining
whether a lawsuit may be brought against the United States under
the FTCA requires a case-by-case analysis. Consequendy, it is uncer-
tain what claims would result in relief to those adversely affected by
clean-up initiatives. 77
A. Application of Discretionary Function Exception of the
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
1. The First Prong: The Element of Choice
As discussed previously, the reviewing court must first deter-
mine whether the activity involves any element of judgment or
choice. 78 Judgment or choice is direcdy related to whether statute
or regulation require the conduct at issue. 79 Few cases successfully
show a clear violation of mandatory guidelines by the appropriate
person, and therefore, few cases overcome the first hurdle of the
two-prong Discretionary Exception Function test.80
74. See Easton, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at **3-4 (employing two-part test from
FTCA discretionary exception to sovereign immunity).
75. See id. at **7-8 (providing holding of case).
76. For a discussion of Hurricane Katrina's impact, see supra note 1 and ac-
companying text.
77. See Hayner, supra note 31, at 135 (citing Redland Soccer Club v. Dep't of the
Army, 835 F. Supp. 803, 808 (1993) (noting determinations of whether case fell
under Discretionary Function Exception is fact specific).
78. See id. (discussing first part of FTCA's Discretionary Function Exception
two-part test).
79. See id. at 146 (analyzing first part of Discretionary Function Exception
test).
80. See id. (discussing cases deciding whether clear mandatory guideline has
been violated by governmental employee).
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In Zumwalt v. United States (Zumwalt),81 the court determined
the National Park Service's seemingly clear policies for dangerous
trail repair involved an element ofjudgment or choice. 82 The court
grounded its decision on the fact that the policies did not specifi-
cally address how to determine what constituted a dangerous park
trail, including what improvements must be made to rectify danger
and the location of the improvements.8 3 Similarly, in Daniels v.
United States (Daniels),84 the court determined a regulation in-
structing that the edge of trimmers be guarded still involved some
element of judgment or choice because the type of guard to be
used was unspecified.8 5
In evaluating claims related to hurricane clean-up, validity of
the claims is based on the FTCA or the DREAA, both of which con-
tain equivalent exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity. 86
Regardless of the applicable statute, the same two-part test
applies. 87
The DREAA only mandates removal; it does not provide spe-
cific, mandatory instructions for how that debris should be re-
moved. 88 Judgment or choice is inherent in the lack of proscribed
instructions.89 After the government decides to remove debris, the
agencies have the choice of how to remove the debris, including
when to remove the debris, what manner to remove the debris and
where to deposit the debris.90
The Southern District of Florida and the Eastern District of
New York have both held that disaster relief efforts innately include
81. 928 F.2d 951, 951 (10th Cir. 1991).
82. See id. (laying groundwork for analyzing first part of Discretionary Func-
tion Exception analysis); see also Hayner, supra note 31, at 146 (citing same illustra-
tive case to demonstrate where procedures contain elements of judgment or
choice).
83. See Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 951 (explaining judgment or choice involved).
84. 967 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1992).
85. See id. at 1465 (discussing situation where governmental activities involved
element ofjudgment or choice); see also Hayner, supra note 31, at 147 (discussing
elements of judgment and choice); Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1528
(11th Cir. 1993) (explaining significance of Zumwalt).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 5173(a) (2000) (providing guidelines for debris removal).
87. See Hayner, supra note 31, at 130 (discussing FTCA).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 5173(a) (providing text of statute). This conclusion is
based on the lack of procedural requirements provided in the statute. See id.
89. See id. (providing text of statute). This statement is evidenced by the fact
that even though the statute fails to specify the manner in which the debris should
be removed, debris removal is still required under the statute. See id.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 5173 (providing text of statute).
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an element of judgment or choice. 91 In Sunrise, the court held re-
moval of hurricane debris from Hurricane Andrew contained the
requisite element of judgment under the DREAA.92 Similarly, in
Easton, the court found there was no mandate for hurricane debris
removal. 93 The court said that the DREAA did not govern the spe-
cifics of how debris was to be removed, and the federal agency
charged with removal used judgment in choosing how to remove
it.9 4 Absent clear-cut guidelines governing the how, what and
where of debris removal, courts reviewing Hurricane Katrina relief
cases will presumably also find an element of judgment or choice.
Likewise, in Devito, the court also found projects aimed at alle-
viating hurricane damage contained elements of choice.95 Despite
the procedures for stabilizing shorelines, the court determined an
element of choice was involved because the federal agency had to
choose which procedure to implement. 96 Therefore, even with
clear-cut guidelines for debris removal, if there is more than one
removal option, a court will likely find an element of choice in the
removal of Hurricane Katrina debris.
Based on these cases, it is apparent that hurricane debris re-
moval and actions taken to alleviate hurricane destruction generally
involves the judgment of the parties.97 Consequently, an action
brought by a citizen for further damage resulting from hurricane
debris removal must satisfy an exceptionally high threshold to pass
the first prong of the Discretionary Function Exception analysis. 98
91. See Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home Park v. Phillips &Jordan, 960 F.2d at 285 (S.D.
Fla. 1996) (holding hurricane clean-up efforts included element of judgment or
choice); Devito v United States, 12 F. Supp. 2d 269, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding
efforts to combat hurricane damage included element of judgment or choice);
Easton v. Gilbert S. Corp, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20563 at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 1994)
(holding deposit of hurricane debris onto private property included element of
judgment or choice).
92. See Sunrise, 960 F. Supp. at 270 (providing overview of case facts and
holding).
93. See Easton, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7 (providing holding of case).
94. See Sunrise, 960 F. Supp. at 285 (discussing elements of judgment or
choice).
95. See Devito, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 269-70 (providing facts of case).
96. See id. at 269 (providing holding of case).
97. See Sunrise, 960 F. Supp. at 285 (discussing choice of parties chosen for
debris removal); Devito, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 270 (providing holding of case); Easton,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7 (holding element of choice in debris removal).
98. See Hayner, supra note 31, at 130 (analyzing Discretionary Function
Exception).
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If the first prong is satisfied, the next step is to analyze the judg-
ment exercised by governmental agencies.99
2. The Second Prong: Discretionary Function Exception Protection
To pass the second prong of this test, the court must deter-
mine whether the Discretionary Function Exception protects the
judgment or choice exercised.100 Protected choices include those
based on policy considerations. 10 1 The court is directed and
guided by Congress's intention to prevent the judiciary from sec-
ond-guessing decisions based on social, economic and public policy
considerations. 1 0 2
In the wake of a natural disaster affecting millions of people
and costing billions of dollars, social, economic and public policy
issues are inarguably considerations in cleaning up the after-
math. 10 3 Overarching social considerations include preventing
mayhem and providing quick responses to facilitate the survival of
those left homeless and hungry by the hurricane destruction. 10 4 In
Sunrise, the court held the DREAA implicitly included public safety
and health policies after a natural disaster. 10 5 The court further
stated no facts, other than the action charged related to hurricane
clean-up, were necessary to determine whether policy considera-
tions were involved.'0 6
99. See id. at 133 (describing scope of second prong of Discretionary Function
Exception test).
100. See id. (discussing scope of second prong).
101. See id. at 135 (discussing protected governmental choices).
102. See Sunrise, 960 F. Supp. at 286-87 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (dismissing suit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because action fell within Discretionary Function
Exception of FTCA).
103. See AFTER THE STORM: WORKING THROUGH THE IMPLICATIONS OF HuRRI-
CANE KATRINA, PUBLIC AGENDA (2005), http://www.publicagenda.org/specials/ka-
trina/katrina.cfm (discussing nationwide implications of Hurricane Katrina) (last
visited Oct. 30, 2006); Public Safety Communication from 9/11 to Hurricane Katrina:
Public Policy Lessons, 109th Cong. 13-16 (2005) (statement of Kevin Martin, FCC
Chairman) (discussing public policy implications of Hurricane Katrina); Mark L.
Burton & Michael J. Hicks, HURRICANE KATRINA: PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF COM-
MERCIAL AND PUBLIC SECTOR DAMAGES (2005), http:// www.marshall.edu/cber/re-
search/katrina/Katrina-Estimates.pdf (discussing economic damage caused by
Hurricane Katrina) (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
104. See New Orleans Evacuation Under Way, CNN.com (2005), http://www.cnn
.com/2005/WEATHER/08/31/katrina.impact/ (communicating severity of situa-
tion in New Orleans).
105. See Sunrise, 960 F. Supp. at 286 (evaluating second prong of Discretionary
Function Exception test).
106. See id. (stating no further pleading requirements existed other than not-
ing action related to hurricane clean-up).
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Economic considerations are also at the forefront of this analy-
sis.107 Cities that were once self-sufficient prior to the storm will
require billions of dollars of investments to once again achieve sta-
bility.'08 Further economic interests include rebuilding what was
destroyed, including homes and businesses. 10 9 Specifically, it has
been estimated that there are "commercial structure damages of
$21 [b] illion, commercial equipment damages of $36 [b] illion, resi-
dential structure and content damages of almost $75 [b]illion, elec-
tric utility damages of $231 [m]illion, highway damages of $3
[m]illion, sewer system damages of $1.2 [b]illion and commercial
revenue losses of $4.6 [b]illion." 110
In Devito, the court held that economic considerations alone
are enough to satisfy the second prong of the Discretionary Func-
tion Exception test.11' In this case, the mission statement of the
Army Corps of Engineers included a cost benefit analysis state-
ment. 12 The court concluded that all actions undertaken by the
Army Corps of Engineers contained the necessary economic consid-
erations to shield their actions under the Discretionary Function
Exception.1 35 Therefore, it is likely that any action based on the
hurricane debris removal by a government agency would contain
the requisite element of policy considerations.
In addition to both the social and economic policy matters, it is
necessary to consider the public interest.1 4 Much of the United
States population was touched by Hurricane Katrina; many people
lost loved ones and property.115 Millions of Americans opened
their hearts and wallets to contribute to the rebuilding efforts. 1 6
107. See Burton & Hicks, supra note 101, at 7 (discussing economic implica-
tions of Hurricane Katrina).
108. See id. at 1 (estimating economic damage in wake of Hurricane Katrina).
109. See id. (providing specific damage estimates).
110. See id. (discussing economic damage caused by Hurricane Katrina).
11i. See Devito v United States, 12 F. Supp. 2d 269, 272 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (discuss-
ing second prong of Discretionary Function Exception test).
112. See id. (providing text of Army Corps of Engineers mission statement).
113. See id. (analyzing second prong of Discretionary Function Exception).
114. See Burton & Hicks, supra note 101, at 6-8 (discussing economic implica-
tions of Hurricane Katrina).
115. See FirstGov.com (2006), http://www.firstgov.gov/Citizen/Topics/Pub-
licSafety/HurricaneKatrinaRecovery.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2006) (providing
links to those searching for loved ones missing after Hurricane Katrina).
116. See Facts at a Glance, American Red Cross Response to Hurricane Ka-
trina and Rita (2006), http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/hurricanes/katrina_
facts.html (Jan. 19, 2006) (estimating Red Cross received over two billion dollars in
gifts and pledges for hurricane relief).
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The disaster affected the lives of all Americans in some respect,
highlighting widespread public policy issues. 117
The Easton court embraced such public policy considerations
in its holding.118 It stated the clean-up of hurricane debris follow-
ing a natural disaster is the explicit kind of function the Discretion-
ary Function Exception was designed to protect. 11 9 Accordingly,
the court found the federal agency's actions were protected by the
Discretionary Function Exception. 120
Arguably, no court would find that these considerations are
not policy-related and limit civilian protection by the Discretionary
Function Exception. 121 It is also likely that claims arising out of a
lawsuit for further property damage caused by debris removal will
be dismissed, leaving no avenues of relief.' 22
IV. CONCLUSION
Current relief mechanisms are insufficient for recovery by
those who suffered further damage from clean-up efforts of Hurri-
cane Katrina. 123 The sovereign immunity that exists to protect the
government disadvantages those ravaged by both a natural disaster
and potentially negligent governmental activities. 124 The Discre-
tionary Function Exception analysis contains numerous loopholes
to protect federal agencies in the specific context of disaster clean-
up. 1
2 5
First, courts have failed to construe judgment or choice in
favor of the complaining party, finding practically every action con-
tains an element of judgment or choice. 126 An argument for
change may focus on mandating specific guidelines for debris re-
117. For a discussion of public policy issues, see supra note 1, at 135 and ac-
companying text.
118. See Easton v. Gilbert S. Corp, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20564 at *8 (S.D. Fla
Nov. 23, 1994) (discussing second prong of Discretionary Function Exception
analysis).
119. See id. (discussing applicability of discretion).
120. See id. (providing outcome).
121. For a discussion of case precedent, see supra notes 56-75.
122. For a discussion of relevance of subject matter jurisdiction, see supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
123. For a discussion of current relief mechanisms, see supra notes 31-38 and
accompanying text.
124. For a discussion of sovereign immunity, see supra notes 5-6 and accompa-
nying text.
125. For a discussion of the Discretionary Function Exception, see supra notes
39-42 and accompanying text.
126. For a discussion of decisions involving elements of judgment or choice,
see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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moval; however, because hurricane damage will vary based on loca-
tion, specific mandates may be unreasonable. Further, having
guidelines based on location would still yield a negative result for
those seeking relief because having alternatives to choose from still
involves an element of choice. 127 A court faced with this analysis is
likely to find judgment or choice inherent in any clean-up decision
and relief will be unavailable for those seeking it.
Second, courts have consistently held that social, economic,
and public policy decisions are inherent in disaster relief efforts. 128
It is futile to argue that clean-up efforts in the wake of a natural
disaster do not include some policy considerations.12 9 Because pol-
icy considerations are at the heart of clean-up efforts, an action
based on damage caused by removal of debris from a natural disas-
ter will almost always be barred.130
The current Discretionary Function Exception effectually pro-
tects the government from all actions arising out of debris removal
following a natural disaster. 131 Those who suffer property damage
from clean-up efforts have no form of judicial relief.132 While try-
ing to balance the competing interests of protecting the govern-
ment from frivolous suits with protecting its citizens' properties
from further damage, the current legislation falls short of providing
a remedy for those most in need. 133
Samantha Turino
127. For a discussion of illustrative cases, see supra notes 56-75 and accompa-
nying text.
128. For a discussion of factors relevant to disaster clean-up efforts, see supra
notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
129. For a discussion of cases illustration futile public policy arguments, see
supra notes 56, 64 and 69 and accompanying text.
130. See id. (providing illustrative cases barring relief based on public policy
considerations).
131. For a discussion of the Discretionary Function Exception, see supra note
39 and accompanying text.
132. For a discussion of lack of relief avenues, see supra notes 121-22 and
accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of cases barring relief under the FTCA, see supra notes
56, 64, 69 and accompanying text.
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